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Introduction 
We offer a translation into English of the original French version published in 1777 of 
Buffon’s Essai d’Arithmetique Morale. In this classic work, Buffon discusses degrees of 
certainty, probability, the moral value of money, the different evaluations of gains and of 
losses; moreover, he proposes repeated experiments to determine the moral value of a game. 
Our hope is that this remarkable work, which anticipates and relates to many aspects 
discussed in more recent literature, reaches a broader audience than the French original 
reaches today. Our belief is that we are first to translate this classic work completely. 
Remaining errors are ours.  
Buffon (1707-1788) was acknowledged, and is mainly remembered, for his opus 
Natural History, of which he finalized thirty-six volumes during his lifetime. Another eight 
volumes were published posthumously.  
His scientific work was generally based on the methods of empirical observation and 
experiment. Based on his evidence, he suggested that the origin of organisms resulted by 
spontaneous generation from smallest particles and the development and diversity from 
climatic changes. Differing from the common view at his time, he believed that the first life 
developed in the sea, and that the stepwise development of the species took long periods. 
Preceding Charles Darwin (1809-1882), he advanced the view of common descent of the 
species, discussing the relation between apes and man. By experimental evidence he showed 
that the earth was older than the 6,000 years calculated by theologians based on biblical data. 
This evidence led to a conflict with the church including the burning of his writings. He had 
to officially revoke his statement, but raised the point again in the Essays. 
Before dedicating himself to natural history, Buffon studied and contributed to 
mathematics during the 1720’s and 1730’s. He communicated, and maintained 
correspondence with, Gabriel Cramer (1704-1752), professor of analysis and geometry at the 
University of Geneva, from 1727 (Weil 1961). So, while it is likely that he started editing the 
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Essays in the 1760’s, his interest in the topic and many of his considered ideas date back to 
the early 1730’s.  
The Essays on Moral Arithmetic contains 25 articles, the first two being introductory. 
As pointed out in them, the work is dedicated to the measurement of, and, more generally, to 
the valuation of uncertainty. Buffon defines levels of uncertainty, or contrariwise, levels of 
certainty, by available evidence observed in nature, or more generally if the causes of a 
certain effect are unknown; if effects repeat constantly, he asserts, then the effect becomes 
certain; after a long sequence of repeated observations effects become physically certain. 
Conversely, if an effect has constantly failed to occur, he suggests, it will come to be refuted. 
He also points out that a change in an assumed constant effect surprises us; such effects have 
been brought to the attention of a great audience through the recent literature (Taleb 2007). 
Buffon illustrates the concept of certainty levels by his example of the experience of the 
sunrise. He reflects on how an ignorant man sees the sunrise, the sunset and learns to 
reinforce his belief and simultaneously to decrease his doubt by repeated experience, finally 
reaching certainty about the return of the sunrise (see articles III-VI).I He refers to physical 
certainty as an “almost infinite” probability level to which he assigns a relationship as of one 
to 999,189,22 .II Note the power term represents the number of days following the first day in 
6,000 years, as this number of years represented the accepted time of existence of man and the 
earth during Buffon’s lifetime; the base term, 2, represents the two possible effects either the 
sun returns on the next day or it does not return.  
If one has only a limited number of observations of a constant effect so that physical 
certainty cannot be inferred, Buffon argues that uncertainty can be so much removed if only 
                                                 
I Reinforcement learning is an algorithm that tries to maximize payoffs under uncertainty by successively 
increasing the weight of better experiences (for further references see Gigerenzer & Selten 2001). In contrast, 
Buffon’s belief learning focuses only on judgment and not on strategy. 
 
II So, we should warn readers at the outset that Buffon uses the word certainty not in the absolute sense that we 
currently use. We think of a certain event as one that is bound to happen, that is, an event that has probability 1 
of happening. However, and rather schizophrenically, we also say that one event is more certain than another. 
This latter sense is that of Buffon. He refers to certainties of different orders and hence uses the word certainty as 
a synonym for probability or likelihood. 
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the number of experiences is sufficiently large; one can achieve moral certainty about the 
effects. Moral certainty can be considered as a boundedly-rational judgment level, sufficiently 
great to draw conclusions on the certainty of constant effects. Given the limitations of time 
and resources on the number of experiences (observations), moral certainty is a substitute for 
physical certainty that enables one to make a boundedly-rational judgment about the effects of 
nature even without understanding its causes. In Buffon’s thinking, moral certainty implies a 
lower degree of certainty than physical certainty, and can be determined either by evidence 
following a constant sequence, or by analogical reasoning based on testimonies of a constant 
sequence. The probability level that Buffon assigns to a complete level of moral certainty is 
one ten-thousandth (see articles VII-IX). This level is based on the argument that a fifty-six 
year old man is fearless about dying during any given day, an event which according to his 
mortality tables, reported elsewhere (Buffon 1777A), occurred with the corresponding relative 
frequency.  
Buffon refers also to different levels of probability for the case when the underlying 
effect is not constant. Discussing such chance effect in more detail, Buffon focuses on the 50-
50 game, where an effect occurs as often as it fails to occur. He suggests that, even in these 
games, the observation of a large number of results from the risk device can give us an 
advantage in the game, if the risk device is biased (see articles X-XI). Thus he indicates that 
underlying probabilities can also be learned from long series of observations, and can deviate 
from a priori probabilities.  
Generally, Buffon condemns participation in games of chance, judging them as 
generally harmful to overall well-being in society (article XII). In particular, he refers to the 
contemporary popular game of Pharaoh, apparently a forerunner of Poker. He argues that 
people behave dishonestly and irrationally with respect to these games of chance. His 
judgment is based on: (1) a value function approach; and (2) a classification of individual 
income as either necessary or superfluous (articles XIII-XIV).  
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(1) His value function exhibits loss aversion, as it punishes losses more than it rewards 
gains. Gains are valued relatively to the ex post income including the gains; losses are valued 
relatively to the a priori income position, that is, before subtracting the losses. Thus since 
losses loom larger than gains, overall well-being is reduced even in fair games. Compared to 
the logarithmic utility function proposed by Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782) which was 
published in 1738, losses are, at the margin, similarly valued, however, the Buffonian value 
function values gains less than losses. Loss aversion is quite accepted among modern 
researchers. For instance, Selten and Chmura (2008) assign a double weight to a loss than to a 
gain in their application of the impulse balance theory to experimental data. Such a double 
weighting of losses relative to gains was suggested by experimental evidence in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). We should mention here, even without further discussion, that modern loss 
aversion decisively differs from the Buffonian version in several respects. However, Buffon 
appears to have been the first to propose loss aversion within a utility approach. This utility 
approach, however and unfortunately, was not embedded in a fully-fledged and fully-
developed theory. 
(2) He nevertheless suggests the existence of individual utility based on the 
requirements of personal needs according to one’s position in society. He defines necessary 
income (that necessary to sustain the social status of an individual) and superfluous income 
(that over and above that which is necessary). This classification suggests that utility is 
structured in a way that necessary income represents a safety-first element, similar to Lopez’s 
aspiration theory (1987). Because of this classification of income, losses lead to a greater loss 
of overall well-being (caused by loss aversion), if the loss in the game is out of the necessary 
income and if the gain increases only the superfluous income, because necessary income must 
be valued higher than superfluous income. Finally, he assumes bounded utility in the sense of 
Cramer, that is, beyond a certain threshold superfluous income gives no extra utility.  
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Buffon dedicates a large part of the Essays to a presentation and discussion of the 
Petersburg gamble (articles XV-XXII). His discussion is so broad that it includes almost all 
currently-known ‘solutions’ to the Petersburg paradox.III In a footnote he quotes at length the 
letter he wrote to Gabriel Cramer in 1730. Thus he proves that some of his ideas preceded 
those of Daniel Bernoulli (1738). He concludes that the Petersburg paradox – that is, the 
discrepancy between the intuitive value and the mathematical expectation – arises from two 
causes; first, the small probabilities of the exorbitantly high payoffs are estimated as zero,IV 
and second, because of the decreasing marginal utility of money the exorbitantly high payoffs 
lead to very low increased values.V Buffon next raises the solvency problem, according to 
which the payoff in the gamble can only be a finite amount, so that the value of the gamble 
must be based on a finite, rather short, gamble length. A remarkable contribution to the 
Petersburg paradox is his determination of the game value by repeated experiment.VI A child 
played out 211 Petersburg gambles to yield an average payoff of about 5 Ecu per game. From 
the outcomes of this experiment, Buffon motivated the geometric payoff distribution that 
results by application of the law of large numbers. Table 1 shows the outcomes of the 
                                                 
III A concise survey of the literature and the solution concepts surrounding the Petersburg paradox accompanied 
by experimental-economics evidence is offered in Neugebauer (2010). 
 
IV The treatment of very small probabilities remains a very controversial issue today. As Selten (1998, p. 51) 
points out: “…In general, it is very difficult to judge how small a very small probability should be. Usually there 
will be no good theoretical reasons to specify a probability as 10-5 or rather than 10-10.  … The value judgment … 
that small differences between small probabilities should be taken very seriously and that wrongly describing 
something extremely improbable as having zero probability is an unforgivable sin… is unacceptable.” 
 
V One may criticise Buffon for not referring to the correspondences of Nicholas Bernoulli (1687–1759). Nicholas 
Bernoulli (1728) had referred to moral certainty in a letter written to Gabriel Cramer so that it is very likely that 
Buffon was aware of the fact that Nicholas Bernoulli had given this explanation earlier. Nevertheless, the value 
of presenting this explanation to a greater audience is an important contribution given that the statement of 
Nicholas Bernoulli had not been widely heard. 
 
VI This experiment seems to be the first conducted statistical experiment ever reported. It was replicated later by 
various researchers. Though the experimental approach is used to elicit the money value of the game, it is not an 
economic experiment, since the economic behaviour of subjects is not the purpose of study. According to the 
definition by Sauermann and Selten (1967, p. 8, our translation) this condition is crucial: “It is advisable to count 
only such experiments to experimental economic research in which the economic behavior of experimental 
subjects is observed. So-called simulation experiments, which only consist in the computation of numerical 
examples for theoretical models on electronic computers, do not belong, in this sense, to experimental economic 
research.” An economic experiment on valuation of lotteries would have to elicit the willingness to pay from 
experimental subjects. A frequently used elicitation procedure in this context is the BDM approach as used in 
Selten et al. (1999). For a more general introduction to economic experiments see Hey (1991). 
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repeated experiment and the statistically expected outcomes. By reflecting on the theoretical 
distribution, Buffon comes to the conclusion that the greater the number of repetitions the 
greater is the expected outcome. He, thus, anticipates partly the mathematical solution to the 
repeated Petersburg gamble as proposed by Feller (1945). In contrast to Bernoulli’s utility 
function, his arguments stand the test of the Super-Petersburg paradox (Menger 1934), again 
by the cancelling of small probabilities and the zero marginal value of the superfluous income 
beyond a certain bound.  
 
Table 1. Buffon’s results 
Number of      
“tails” 
Buffon’s 
observations 
Payoffa) Buffon’s geometric 
approximation 
0 1060 1 210 = 1024 + 1 
1 494 2 29 = 512 
2 232 4 28 = 256 
3 137 8 27 = 128 
4 56 16 26 = 64 
5 29 32 25 = 32 
6 25 64 24 = 16 
7 8 128 23 = 8 
8 6 256 22 = 4 
9 - 512 21 = 2 
10 - 1024 20 = 1 
a) The total payoff was 10,057 Ecu, an average of 4.91 Ecu. 
 
The contribution of the last two articles in the Essays preceding the concluding one 
(article 25) is more to mathematics than to moral behaviour. Buffon presents his games of the 
franc-carreau and Buffon’s needle (article 23); the latter is the reason why his name still 
remains in the mathematical sciences. The contribution is important since it introduces 
 9
geometrical probability to the literature. According to available information on the internet, 
Buffon conducted experiments by throwing a stick over his shoulder into a tiled room. In 
similar random experiments on Buffon’s needle, the number π was approximated in the 19th 
century.   
Finally, Buffon discusses the meaning of infinity (article 24) by highlighting its value 
as a mathematical tool which allows the generalisation of results and by pointing out that it is 
not a ‘real’ number.VII 
Summing up, the Essays present a collection of articles of Buffon dedicated to 
judgment and behaviour, including experimental methods and mathematics. Regardless of a 
number of issues that one can take with his presentation from a modern-day perspective (as it 
lacks a fully-fledged and fully-developed approach, and is not always convincing), it appears 
remarkable to see how much thought, discussed today in the human sciences literature, was 
already expressed during the eighteenth century. Buffon’s Essays is outstanding from the 
standpoint of today when compared to many other works of that age because of its many and 
remarkable contributions: the introduction of the valuation of a game by experimental method, 
thus highlighting also the importance of empirical evidence; the discussion based on 
philosophical arguments of levels of significant and negligible probabilities; the valuation of 
losses and its distinction to the valuation of gains; the distinguishing of necessary income 
from superfluous income; and, finally, the introduction of geometric probability. 
Before concluding, one remaining question must evidently be addressed. Since this 
paper has been prepared for publication in honour of Reinhard Selten, the reader may ask 
what is the relationship between Buffon, his Essays, and Reinhard Selten and his work?-
Thereto we reply that although we do not know of any direct link, we see relationships and 
                                                 
VII Following the 25 described articles, Buffon dedicates another ten articles to “arithmetic and geometric 
measures”. These articles look to us less relevant to the study of human sciences and are therefore omitted in the 
translation. 
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analogies in (1) spirit, (2) presentation, (3) methodology, (4) thought, and (5) the grandeur of 
scientific contribution.  
(1) Although Reinhard Selten is evidently a modern researcher, in our view he 
shares the mind-set of the great savants of the age of the enlightenment, that is, the dedication 
to research driven only by the desire to find and communicate the truth about the nature of 
things. Owed to the conservativeness of academic reviewers who were not always open to 
Selten’s unorthodox theories, and he being reluctant to making any changes to his work that 
could bias his vision of the truth, he would publish his famous papers unchanged in unknown 
academic journals rather than having the changed version published in a prestigious journal. 
Even though the prestige of publishing in such journals would have helped his career at that 
time, he accepted the facts in a humorous way. We remember him saying that by publishing 
in an unknown journal “you can make a journal famous.” He surely made several journals 
famous as he was frequently quoted for his publications in journals that were quite unknown 
or nonexistent before his publication. This achievement is evidently more exceptional than 
publishing in a famous journal, but it is a rocky road to making any impact in the human 
sciences, even for an exceptionally brilliant mind. He also pointed to the fact that in earlier 
times, as in the Buffon’s, researchers had to start writing an essay on scientific questions by 
first apologizing for daring to raise these questions at all (see article I).  
(2) Selten’s archer (Selten and Buchta 1994) who represents direction learning 
theory is as original and as illustrative as the great Buffonian metaphor of the blind man who 
learns by experience about the return of the sunrise. Nevertheless both presentations share a 
similar description about the learning of information about unknown things and the 
adjustment in hindsight. The difference, indeed, is in the adjustment itself; while the blind 
man adjusts his belief, the archer adjusts his strategy. The archer learns hitting a target with an 
arrow, similarly to a blind man, only by repeated experience through feedback information. If 
he is informed that the arrow missed the target to the left, on the next trial, he is going to 
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adjust the direction of the arrow to the right rather than to the left, and vice versa. This 
direction learning theory has shown to explain the behaviour of most experimental subjects in 
economics laboratory experiments in very different scenarios (see Selten 2004 for a review). 
Impulse balance theory is based on this direction learning story; it allows point-predictions of 
behaviour by balancing potential positive and negative impulses in games of strategy (for a 
simple application of this concept, see Selten and Neugebauer 2006). 
(3) Selten has used mainly mathematical and experimental approaches in his 
research. Similarly to Buffon, he was fascinated by mathematics from his youth, received a 
degree in mathematics, before he turned to applied mathematics and experimental research. 
During his career, his main interests have involved the measurement and valuation of games, 
both theoretically and experimentally, and in the construction of solution concepts based on 
(levels of) rationality.   
(4) Selten sees limits to the benefit of mathematics in the understanding of human 
behaviour. In the language of Buffon (article II), we can imagine although we did not witness, 
Selten could have said: “maths involves the truth of definitions. This truth is only helpful if 
one understands the problem well, that is, if the analysis of the problem is based on the right 
definitions.” The Reinhard Selten School believes in the merit of experimental research to 
uncover the fundamental definitions of human behaviour, and to support the building of a 
boundedly rational system in form of a toolbox if a fully-fledged theory and fully-developed 
approach is not available. Buffon also seems to favour a boundedly rational system to human 
beings over pure rationality, as he states that rationality is cold and does not make man really 
happy. In particular, he accepts that less rare people gamble from time to time because hope 
makes them happy. In the language of Selten, many people tend to avoid risk taking as much 
as they can, but on some occasions they enjoy and permit themselves to take risks; “today I 
take a chance.”  
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In relation to Buffon’s discussion of the Petersburg gamble, Selten accepts, at least 
from the behavioural viewpoint, a treatment of very small probabilities as zero. Discussing the 
outcomes of valuations of the Petersburg gamble by experimental subjects, Reinhard Selten 
was not at all surprised that according to the data people behave as if they neglect very small 
probabilities in the Petersburg gamble; “of cause they do that.”  
(5) Originality and the greatness of ideas which lead to path-breaking approaches 
must be used as a description of the work of both Buffon and Selten.VIII While we do not 
know about Buffon, Selten had a reason for being so original. He argued that he was slower 
than other researchers and therefore had to take greater steps. Both had a great impact on the 
development of research in games and experiments; Buffon as the founding father of 
experimental statistics; Reinhard Selten as the founding father of experimental economics in 
Europe. Finally, both have influenced thinking, being thought provoking and created great 
interests in the subject of their research. 
 
Reinhard Selten is very active with his current research. Recently, at the celebration of 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics, he said that 
he was the “money most-intensive researcher” at the economics department at Bonn. So 
looking forward, we expect many new researches, advancements of the field bounded 
rationality and enlightening ideas of and by Reinhard Selten. 
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Essays on Moral Arithmetic 
I. I do not attempt to present general essays on morality here; that would demand 
more enlightenment than I can presume, and more art than I recognize.  The first 
and most sensible part of morality is rather an application of the maxims of our 
divine religion than of a human science; and I cannot even dare to try matters 
where the law of God is our principle, and Faith our rationale.  The respectful 
gratitude or rather the adoration, man has to his Creator; brotherly charity, or 
rather the love he has to his fellow man, are natural feelings and virtues written on 
an ingenuous mind; all that stems from this pure source bears the character of the 
truth; the light is so bright that the existence of error cannot obscure it, the 
evidence so great that it admits no argument or discussion, or doubt, and no other 
measures than conviction.   
The measurement of uncertain things is my object here. I will try to give some 
rules to estimate likelihood ratios, degrees of probability, weights of testimonies, 
influence of risks, inconvenience of perils; and judge at the same time the real 
value of our fears and of our hopes. 
 
II. There are truths of different kinds, certainties of different orders, probabilities of 
different degrees.  The purely intellectual truths like those of Geometry all reduce 
themselves to truths of definition; it is a matter of resolving the most difficult 
problem only to understand it well, and there are no other difficulties in calculation 
and in the other purely theoretical sciences than to untangle what we put in, and to 
untie the knots that the human mind has created in the study of the implications of  
the definitions and the assumptions that are used as the foundation and framework 
of these sciences.  All their propositions always can be proven evidently, because 
you can always go back from each of these propositions to other preceding 
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propositions which are identical to them, and from these to others back to the 
definitions.  It is for this reason that evidenceIX itself belongs to the mathematical 
sciences and only to them; because one must distinguish the evidence of reasoning 
from the evidence that comes through the senses, that is, the intellectual evidence 
from the physical intuition; the latter is only a clear apprehension of objects or of 
images; while reasoning is a comparison of similar or identical ideas, or rather it is 
the immediate perception of their identity.   
 
III. In the physical sciences, evidence is replaced by certainty; evidence is not 
susceptible to measure, because it has only one absolute property, that is the clear 
negation or the affirmation of the matter it shows; but certainty is never a positive 
absolute one, it requires several relationships that we must compare and from 
which we can estimate the measure.  Physical certainty, that is, the most certain of 
all certainties, is nevertheless only the almost infinite probability that an effect, an 
event that never failed to happen, will happen again; for example, because the sun 
has always risen, it is thenceforth physically certain that it will rise tomorrow; a 
reason for being is to have been, but a reason for ceasing to be is to have come into 
being; and consequently one cannot say that it is equally certain that the sun will 
always rise, at least one must assume a preceding eternity, equal to the subsequent 
perpetuity, otherwise it will end as it has begun.  For we must judge the future by 
the evidence from the past, whenever something has always been, or if it always 
behaved the same way, we must be assured that it will be or will behave always in 
the very same way: by always, I mean a very long time, and not an absolute 
eternity, the always of the future never being equal to the always of the past.  The 
absolute of any kind, whatsoever, is not the responsibility of Nature or of the 
                                                 
IX  [comment : Buffon uses the word évidence, which we translate throughout by evidence, also in the sense of 
something obvious or evident]. 
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human mind.  Men have considered as ordinary, natural effects all the events that 
have this kind of physical certainty; an always occurring effect ceases surprising 
us; in contrast a phenomenon that has never occurred, or one that has always 
occurred in the same way but ceases to occur or occurs in a different way would 
surprise us with reason and would be an event that appears to us so extra-ordinary 
that we would consider it as supernatural.  
 
IV. These natural effects that do not surprise us, however, have everything necessary 
to surprise us; what circumstances of causes, what collection of principles is not 
necessary to produce a single insect, a single plant! What a prodigious 
combination of elements, motions and springs in the animal machine!  The 
smallest works of Nature are subjects of the greatest admiration.  The reason why 
we are not at all surprised by all these wonders is that we were born into this world 
of wonders, that we have always seen them, that our understanding and our eyes 
are equally accustomed to them; finally, all were before and will be still after us.  
If we had been born in a different world with a different physical shape and 
different senses, we would have had other relationships with exterior objects, we 
would have seen different wonders and we would not have been more surprised; 
the wonders of this world and of the other are based on the ignorance of the causes, 
and on the impossibility of knowing the reality of the things, of which we are only 
permitted to see are the relationships they have with ourselves.   
There are therefore two ways of looking at the natural effects; the first is to see 
them as they present themselves to us without paying attention to their causes, or 
rather without looking for their causes; the second is to examine the effects in the 
view to relating them to the principles and causes; and these two points of view are 
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strongly different and produce different reasons for surprise, the one causes the 
sensation of surprise, and the other creates the feeling of admiration. 
 
V. We will speak here only of this first way to look at the effects of Nature; as 
incomprehensible, as complicated as they present themselves to us, we will judge 
them as the most evident and the simplest ones, and judge them only by their 
results; for example, if we cannot conceive or even imagine why matter attracts 
each other, we will certainly be satisfied that it actually attracts each other, and we 
will judge from that time that it always has attracted each other and that it always 
will continue to attract each other: it is the same with other phenomena of all kinds, 
as unbelievable as they may appear to us, we will believe them if we are sure that 
they have occurred very often, we will doubt them if they have failed to happen as 
often as they occurred, finally, we will deny them if we believe for sure that they 
never occurred; in a word, according to having seen and recognized them, or to 
having seen and recognized the opposite.   
But if the experience is the basis of our physical and moral knowledge, then 
analogy is the first instrument: when we observe that a thing occurs constantly in a 
particular way, we are assured by our experience that it will occur again in the 
same way; and when someone reports that a thing occurred in this or that way, if 
these facts have an analogy with the other facts that we know by ourselves, then 
we believe them; on the contrary, if the fact has no analogy with ordinary effects, 
that is, with the things that are known to us, we must be in doubt; and if it is 
directly opposed to what we know, we do not hesitate to deny it. 
 
VI. Experience and analogy may give us different certainties, sometimes almost equal 
and sometimes of the same kind; for example, I am almost as certain of the 
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existence of the city of Constantinople, which I never have seen, as I am of the 
existence of the Moon, that I have seen so often, and that because the testimonies 
in large number can produce a certainty almost equal to the physical certainty, 
when they concern things that have a full analogy with those that we know.  The 
physical certainty must be measured by an immense number of probabilities, 
because such certainty is produced by a constant sequence of observations, which 
are what we call the experience of all the times.  The moral certainty must be 
measured by a smaller number of probabilities, since it presupposes only a number 
of analogies with what is known to us.   
Assuming a man that had never seen anything, heard anything, we investigate 
how the belief and the doubt generate itself in his mind; assume him struck for the 
first time by the appearance of the sun; he sees it shine from the top of the skies, 
then decline and finally disappear; what can he conclude? Nothing, except that he 
saw the sun, that he saw it follow a certain route, and that he no longer sees it; but 
this star reappears and disappears again on the next day; this second sight is a first 
experience, that must produce in him the hope to see the sun again, and he begins 
to believe that it could return, nevertheless he is very much in doubt; the sun 
reappears again; this third sight is a second experience which diminishes the doubt 
as much as it increases the probability of a third return; a third experience 
increases it to the point that he no longer doubts that the sun returns a fourth time; 
and finally when he will have seen this light-star appear and disappear regularly 
ten, twenty, hundred times again, he will believe to be certain that he will see it 
always appear, disappear and to move the same way; the more similar observations 
he will have, the greater will be the certainty to see the sun rise the next day; every 
observation, that is, every day, produces a probability, and the sum of these 
probabilities together, as it is very great, gives the physical certainty; one will 
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therefore always be able to express this certainty by the numbers, dating back to 
the origin of the time of our experience and it will be the same for all the others 
effects of Nature; for example, if one wants to reduce here the seniority of the 
world and of our experience to six thousand years, the sun has risen for us1 only 2 
million 190 thousand times, and as to date back to the second day that it rose, the 
probabilities to rise the next day increase, as the sequence 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64.… 
or 12 −n .  One will have (where the natural sequence of the numbers, n  is equal to 
2,190,000), one will have, I say, 999,189,21 22 =−n ; this already is such a prodigious 
number that we ourselves cannot form an idea, and it is by this reason that one 
must look at the physical certainty as composed from an immensity of 
probabilities; since by moving back the creation date by only two thousand years, 
this immensity of probabilities becomes 000,22  times more than 999,189,22 .X 
 
VII. But it is not so easy to do the estimation of the value of analogy, nor consequently, 
to find the measure of moral certainty; it is in truth the degree of probability that 
gives analogical reasoning its power; and in itself the analogy is only the aggregate 
of the relationships with known things; nevertheless according to that aggregate or 
that relationship in general being more or less great, the consequence of the 
analogical reasoning will be more or less certain, but without ever being absolutely 
certain; for example, if a witness whom I suppose being of common sense, tells me 
that a child has just been born in this city, I will believe him without hesitating, as 
the fact of a child’s birth is nothing other than very ordinary, but having on the 
contrary an infinity of relationships with the known things, that is, with the births 
of all other children, I will believe this fact therefore, however, without being 
                                                 
1 I say for us, or rather for our climate, because it would not be exactly true for the climate of the poles. 
 
X [comment: Buffon obviously means days rather than years.] 
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absolutely certain about it; if the same man tells me that this child was born with 
two heads, I would believe it again, but more weakly, as a child with two heads 
has less relationships with known things; if he added that the newborn has not only 
two heads, but that it has also six arms and eight legs, I should have good reason to 
hardly believe it, but however weak my belief was, I could not refuse it in entirety; 
this monster, although very special, nevertheless being composed only of parts that 
all have some relationships with known things, and only having their assembly and 
their very extraordinary number.  The power of the analogical reasoning will 
therefore be always proportional to the analogy itself, that is, to the number of the 
relationships with known things, and it is not a matter of making a good analogical 
reasoning, but to adjust oneself well to the fact of all the circumstances, to 
compare them with the analogous circumstances, to aggregate the number of these, 
to take next a model of comparison to which one will relate this found value, and 
one will have exactly the probability, that is, the degree of power of the analogical 
reasoning. 
 
VIII. There is therefore a prodigious distance between the physical certainty and the 
certainty of the kind that one can deduce from most of the analogies; the first one 
is an immense sum of probabilities that forces us to believe; the other is only a 
smaller or greater probability, and often so small that it leaves us in the perplexity.  
The doubt is always inversely proportional to the probability, that is, it is always 
the greater the smaller the probability.  In the order of the certainties produced by 
the analogy, one must place the moral certainty, which seems to even take the 
centre between doubt and physical certainty; and this centre is not a point, but a 
very extensive line, for which it is quite difficult to determine the limits: one can 
feel that it is a certain number of probabilities that equals the moral certainty, but 
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what number is it? And can we hope to determine it as precisely as the one by 
which we have just represented the physical certainty?   
After having reflected on it, I have thought that of all the possible moral 
probabilities, the one that most affects man in general is the fear of death, and I felt 
from that time that any fear or any hope, whose probability would be equal to the 
one that produces the fear of death, can morally be taken as the unit to which one 
must relate the measure of the other fears; and I relate to the same even the one of 
hopes, since there is no difference between hope and fear, other than from positive 
to negative; and the probabilities of both must be measured in the same way.  I 
seek therefore for what is actually the probability that a man who is doing well, 
and consequently has no fear of death, dies nevertheless in the twenty-four hours: 
consulting the Mortality Tables, I see one can deduce that there are only ten 
thousand one hundred eighty-nine to bet against one, that a fifty-six year old man 
will live more than a day.2 Now as any man of that age, when reason has attained 
its full maturity and the experience all its force, nevertheless has no fear of death 
in the twenty-four hours, although there is only ten thousand one hundred eighty-
nine to bet against one that he will die in this short interval of time; from this I 
conclude that any equal or smaller probability must be regarded as zero, since any 
fear or any hope below ten thousand must not affect us or even occupy for a single 
moment the heart or the mind.3  
                                                 
2 See hereafter the result of the mortality Tables [comment: the tables are not included in the translation].  
  
3 Having communicated this idea to Mr. Daniel Bernoulli, one of the greatest geometricians of our century, and 
most experienced in all of the science of probabilities, here is the response that he gave me by his letter, dated 
from Bâle March 19, 1762.   
"I strongly approve, Sir, your way to estimate the limits of moral probabilities; you consult the nature of 
man by his actions, and you suppose indeed, that no one worries in the morning to die that day; hence, he will 
die according to you, with probability one in ten thousand; you conclude that one ten-thousandth of probability 
should not make any impression in the mind of man, and consequently this one ten-thousandth has to be 
regarded as an absolute nothing.  This is doubtless the reasoning of a Mathematician-Philosopher; but this 
ingenious principle seems to lead to a smaller quantity, because the absence of fear is certainly not in those 
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To make me better understood, suppose that in a lottery where there is only a 
single prize and ten thousand blanks, a man takes only one ticket, I say that the 
probability to obtain the prize is only as one against ten thousand, his hope is zero, 
since there is no more probability, that is, reason to hope for the prize, than there 
are fears of death within twenty-four hours; and that this fear not affecting him in 
any way, the hope for the prize must not affect him more, and even again much 
less, since the intensity of the fear of death is much greater than the intensity of 
any other fear or of any other hope.  If, despite the evidence of this demonstration, 
this man insists on wanting to hope, and if a similar lottery is played every day, 
and he persists in buying a new ticket every day, always hoping to win the prize, 
one could, to disabuse him, bet with him at equal odds that he was dead before he 
won the prize.   
It is the same in all the games, the bets, the perils, the risks; in all cases, in a 
word, where the probability is smaller than 000,10/1 , it must be, and it is in fact 
for us, absolutely zero; and by the same reason in all cases where this probability 
is greater than 10,000, it makes for us the moral certainty most complete.   
 
IX. From it we can conclude that the physical certainty relates to the moral certainty as 
000,10:2 999,189,2 ; and that whenever an event, of which we absolutely ignore the 
cause, occurs in the same way thirteen or fourteen times in a row, we are morally 
certain that it will occur again even a fifteenth time, for 192,8213 = , and 
384,16214 = , and consequently when this event has occurred thirteen times, there 
                                                                                                                                                        
who are already ill.  I do not fight your principle, but it seems rather to lead to 000,100/1  rather than to 
000,10/1 ."   
I confess to Mr. Bernoulli that as the one ten-thousandth is taken according to the mortality Tables that 
never represent the average man,  that is, men in general, well or sick, healthy or ill, strong or weak, there is 
maybe a little more than ten thousand to bet against one, that a man, healthy and strong will not die in the 
twenty-four hours; but it is hardly necessary to increase this probability to one hundred thousand.  Moreover, 
this difference, although very large, changes nothing of the main implications that I draw from my principle.   
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is 8,192 to bet against 1 that it will occur a fourteenth time; and when it has 
occurred fourteen times, there is 16,384 to bet against 1 that it will occur even a 
fifteenth time, which is a greater probability than the one of 10,000 against 1, that 
is, greater than the probability that makes moral certainty.   
One will perhaps be able to tell me, that although we do not have the fear or the 
worry of sudden death, it must be that the probability of sudden death is zero, and 
that its influence on our conduct is morally zero.  A man whose mind is beautiful, 
when he loves someone, would he not reproach himself to delay a day the 
measures that must assure the happiness of the loved person?  If a friend entrusts 
us with a considerable deposit, would we not put the same day a written comment 
on this deposit? We act therefore in these cases, as if the probability of sudden 
death was something, and we have reason to act like this.  Therefore one must not 
regard the probability of sudden death as zero in general.   
This kind of objection will vanish if one considers that one often does more for 
others than one does for oneself! When one puts a written comment the very 
moment when one receives a deposit, it is only honesty to the owner of the deposit, 
for his tranquillity, and not at all the fear of our death in the next twenty-four hours; 
it is the same attentiveness that makes the happiness of someone or of us, it is not 
the feeling of the fear of an approaching death that guides us, it is our own 
satisfaction that drives us, we seek to enjoy all at the earliest that is possible to us.   
A reasoning that might appear more justified is that all men are inclined to 
flatter; that hope seems to arise from a lower degree of probability than fear; and 
that consequently one is not entitled to substitute the measure of the one with the 
measure of the other: fear and hope are feelings not concrete things; it is possible, 
it is even more likely, that these feelings do not measure the precise degree of 
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probability; and in that case, must one give them an equal measure or even assign 
them no measure?   
Thereto I reply that the measure in question is not on feelings, but on the 
reasons that must originate them, and that any wise man must estimate the value of 
these feelings of fear or of hope only by the degree of probability; because even 
when Nature, for the happiness of man, had given him more inclination towards 
hope than towards fear, it is not less true that probability is the true measure of the 
one and of the other.  It is not even by the application of this measure that one can 
figure out one’s false hopes, or to reassure on its unfounded fears.  
Before finishing this article, I must observe that one must beware of mistaking 
what I called effects of unknown cause; because I understand only the effects of 
which the causes, although unknown, must be supposed constant, such as the 
natural effects; any new discovery in physics noted by thirteen or fourteen 
experiences, all of which are confirmed, already has a degree of equal certainty to 
the one of moral certainty, and this degree of certainty doubles with each new 
experience; so that by multiplying, one approaches more and more the physical 
certainty.  But we must not conclude from this reasoning that the effects of chance 
follow the same law; it is true that in a sense these effects are among those for 
which we ignore the immediate causes; but we know that in general these causes 
are quite far from being able to be supposed constant; on the contrary, they are 
necessarily variable and volatile as much as it is possible.  Thus even by the notion 
of chance itself, it is evident that there is no connection, no dependence, between 
its effects; that consequently the past cannot have any influence on the future, and 
one would be very much and even completely mistaken, if one wanted to infer 
from previous events, any reason for or against the posterior events.  If a card, for 
example, has won three times in a row, it is not less probable that it will win a 
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fourth time, and one can bet equally that it will win or that it will lose, no matter 
how many times it has won or lost, as long as the laws of the game are such that 
the chances are equal.  Presuming or believing the opposite, as some players do, is 
to go against the principle of chance itself, or not to remember that by the 
conventions of the game it is always equally distributed.    
 
X. In the effects for which we see the causes, a single test is sufficient to cause the 
physical certainty; for example, I see that in a clock the weight makes the wheels 
turn, and that the wheels make the pendulum go; I am certain from that time on 
without the need of reiterated experiences, that the pendulum will always go the 
same as long as the weight makes the wheels turn; this is a necessary consequence 
of an arrangement that we made ourselves while constructing the machine; but 
when we see a new phenomenon, an effect in the still unknown Nature, as we are 
ignorant about its causes, and they can be constant or variable, permanent or 
intermittent, natural or accidental, we do not have other means to obtain the 
certainty than by repeating the experience as often as necessary; nothing here 
depends on us and we only know as much as we experiment; we are only assured 
by the effect itself and by the repetition of the effect.  As soon as it has occurred 
thirteen or fourteen times in the same way, we already have a degree of probability 
equal to the moral certainty that it will occur for even a fifteenth time, and from 
this point we soon can cover an immense interval, and conclude by analogy that 
this effect depends on the general laws of Nature; that it is consequently as old as 
all the other effects and that there is physical certainty that it always will occur as 
it always has occurred and it only needed having been observed.   
In the risks that we arranged, balanced and calculated ourselves, one must not 
say that we are ignorant of the causes of the effects: we are ignorant of the true 
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immediate cause of each effect in particular; but we clearly see the first and 
general cause of all the effects.  I do not know, for example, and I even cannot 
imagine in any way, what is the difference of the movements of the hand, to pass 
or not to pass ten with three dice, which nevertheless is the immediate cause of the 
event, but I see evidently by the number and the make of the dice, which are here 
the main and general causes the chances are absolutely equal, you are indifferent 
to betting on passing or not passing ten; I see moreover that these same events, if 
they happen, have no connection, since to every throw of the dice the risk always 
is the same, and nevertheless always new; that the past throw cannot have any 
influence on the throw to come; that one always can equally bet for or against; 
finally that the longer one plays, the greater the number of effects for and the 
number of effects against, they will approach equality.  Making sure that every 
experience here gives a outcome exactly opposite to that of the experience on the 
natural effects, I want to say, the certainty of the inconstancy instead of the one of 
the constancy of the causes; in this one, each test leads to the doubling of the 
probability of the replication of the effect, that is, the certainty of the constancy of 
the cause; in the effects of risk, on the contrary, each test increases the certainty of 
the inconstancy of the cause by showing us always more and more that it is 
absolutely volatile and totally indifferent to produce the one or the other of these 
effects.   
When a gamble is in its nature perfectly fair, the player has no reason to choose 
this or that side; since finally, from the supposed fairness of this game, it 
necessarily follows that there are no good reasons to prefer the one or the other 
side; and consequently if one deliberated, one could only be determined by the 
wrong reasons; also the logic of the players has seemed to me completely wrong, 
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and even the good minds that allow themselves to play fall as players into 
absurdities at which they soon blush as reasonable men.   
 
XI. Besides, all this supposes that after having balanced the risks and having them 
rendered equal, as in the game passing ten with three dice, these same dice which 
are the devices of the risk are as perfect as possible, that is, they are exactly cubic, 
the material is homogenous, the numbers are painted and not marked hollow, so 
that the weight on one face is not more than on any other; but as it is not given to 
man to make anything perfect, and there is no such dice made with this strict 
precision, it is often possible to recognize by observation on which side the 
imperfection of the devices of chance tips the risk.  Thus, it is only necessary to 
attentively observe for a long time the sequence of events, to count them exactly, 
to compare their relative numbers; and if one of these two numbers exceeds by far 
the other, one will be able to conclude, with great reason, that the imperfection of 
the devices of chance destroys the perfect equality of the risk, and gives it actually 
a stronger inclination to one side than to the other.  For example, I suppose that 
before playing passing ten, one of the players was subtle enough, or rather, rogue 
enough to having thrown in advance thousand times the three dice to be used, and 
to having recognized that in these thousand trials there were six hundred that 
passed ten, he will have thenceforth a great advantage over his opponent by betting 
on passing, since by experience the probability of passing ten with these same dice 
relates to the probability of not passing-ten as 600:400 or  3:2.  This difference that 
stems from the imperfection of the devices can therefore be recognized by 
observation, and it is for this reason that the players often change dice and cards, 
when their luck is against them.   
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Thus, however obscure the destinies may be, however opaque the future may 
appear to us, we may nevertheless by reiterated experiences, become, in some 
cases, also enlightened about future events, as if we were beings or rather superior 
natures who immediately deduce the effects from their causes.  And among the 
very things that seem to be pure risk, as games and lotteries, one can again 
recognize the inclination of the risk.  For example, in a lottery drawn every 
fortnight, and in which one publishes the winning numbers, if one observes those 
that most often won during one year, two years, three consecutive years, one can 
deduct, with reason, that the same numbers will win again more often than the 
others; because in any way one can vary the motion and the position of the device 
of chance, it is impossible to render them perfect enough to maintain the absolute 
equality of the chance; there is a certain routine to do, to place, to mix the tickets, 
which even in the midst of confusion produces a certain order, and makes that 
certain tickets must come out more often than the others; it is the same with the 
arrangement of cards to play; they have a kind of sequence of which one can grasp 
some terms by force of observations; because while assembling them with the hand 
one follows a certain routine, the player himself by mixing them has his routine; 
the whole is done in a certain way more often than in another, and thenceforth the 
attentive observer to results collected in large number will always bet with great 
advantage that such card, for example, will follow such other card.  I say that this 
observer will have a great advantage, because the a priori risks must be absolutely 
equal, the least inequality, that is, the least degree of higher probability has very 
great influences on the game, which is in itself only a multiplied and always 
repeated bet.  If this difference recognized by the experience of the inclination of 
the risk was only one hundredth, it is evident that in a hundred throws the observer 
would gain his stake, that is, the sum that he risks every time; so that a player 
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equipped with these dishonest observations, cannot fail to ruin in the long run all 
his opponents.  But we will give a powerful antidote against the epidemic evil of 
the passion of play, and at the same time some preventives against the illusion of 
this dangerous art. 
 
XII. It is generally known that the game is a greedy passion, where the habit is ruinous, 
but this truth has perhaps never been shown unless through a sad experience on 
which one did not reflect enough to correct it by conviction.  A player whose 
wealth is exposed every day to the draws of chance, exhausts himself little by little 
and finally finds himself necessarily ruined; he attributes his losses only to the 
same risk that he blames for unfairness; he equally regrets what he lost as what he 
did not win; the greed and the false hope gave him claims on the goods of others; 
so humbled to find himself in necessity as afflicted to no longer having the means 
to satisfy his cupidity; in his despair he blames his ill-fated star, he does not 
imagine that this blind power, the fortune of the game, marches in truth by an 
indifferent and uncertain pace, but that to every step it nevertheless tends to a goal, 
and pulls to a certain end that is the ruin of those who try it; he does not see that 
the apparent indifference it has for the good or for the evil produces with time the 
necessity of evil, that a long random sequence is a fatal chain whose extension 
causes the misfortune; he does not feel that regardless of the hard tax of the cards 
and of the even harder tribute paid to the roguery of some opponents, he has 
passed his life making ruinous conventions; that finally the game by its very nature 
is a vicious contract in its principle, a harmful contract to each contractor in 
particular, and contrary to the good of any society.   
This is not at all a speech of vague morals, these are precise truths of 
metaphysics that I subject to calculation or rather to the strength of reason; truths 
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that I pretend to mathematically show to all those who have their minds clear 
enough and the imagination strong enough to combine without geometry and to 
calculate without algebra.   
I will not speak about these games invented by the artifice and worked out by 
the avarice, where the chance loses a part of its rights, where the fortune can never 
balance, because it is invincibly entailed and always obligated to lean to one side, I 
want to say all these games where the chances unequally divide up offer at once an 
assured as dishonest gain, and leave the other only with a sure and shameful loss, 
as in Pharaoh, where the banker is only a roguish solicitor and the punter a fool 
whom one agreed not to mock.   
It is in games in general, in the most equal game, and consequently the most 
honest one that I find a vicious essence, I include even in the name of game all the 
conventions, all the bets where one puts at risk a part of his goods to obtain a 
similar part of the goods of others; and I say that in general the game is a 
misunderstood pact, a disadvantageous contract to both parties, whose effect is to 
make the loss always greater than the gain; and to remove the good to add to the 
evil.  The demonstration of it is as easy as evident. 
 
XIII. Take two men of equal fortune, who, for example, each have one hundred 
thousand pounds of goods, and suppose that these two men play in one or more 
throws of the dice fifty thousand pounds, that is, half of their goods; it is certain 
that whoever wins increases his goods only by a third, and that whoever loses 
diminishes his by half; each of them had one hundred thousand pounds before the 
game, but after the event of the game, one will have one hundred fifty thousand 
pounds, that is, a third more than he had, and the other has only fifty thousand 
pounds, that is, half less of what he had; so the loss is a sixth part bigger than the 
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gain; since there is this difference between the third and the half, the agreement to 
play the game is detrimental to both, and consequently essentially vicious.   
This reasoning is not fallacious, it is true and exact, although one player only 
lost precisely what the other won; this numerical equality of the sum does not 
prevent the true inequality of the loss and gain; the equality is only apparent, and 
the inequality very real.  The agreement both men make when betting half of their 
goods is equal to the effect of another agreement that nobody has ever decided to 
make, that would be the agreement to throw each the twelfth part of his goods into 
the sea.  For one can show them, before they risk half of their goods, that the loss 
necessarily being a sixth greater than the gain, this sixth must be considered as a 
real loss, that can indifferently fall on the one or on the other, consequently it has 
to be divided equally.   
If two men decided to play all their goods, what would be the effect of this 
agreement? One would only double his fortune, and the other would reduce his to 
zero; now which proportion is here between the loss and the gain? the same as 
between all and nothing; the gain of the one is only equal to a rather modest sum, 
and the loss of the other is numerically infinite, and morally so great that the work 
of a lifetime would maybe not suffice to regain his goods.   
The loss is therefore infinitely greater than any gain when one plays all his 
goods; it is greater by a sixth part when one plays half of his good, it is greater by a 
twentieth part when one plays the quarter of his good; in one word, however small 
the portion of his fortune that one risks in the game, there is always more to lose 
than to gain; the agreement to play the game is thus a vicious contract that tends to 
ruin the two contract parties.  This is a new truth, but a very useful one, that I wish 
to be known to all of those who, for greed or for laziness, spend their life gambling.   
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One has often asked why one is more sensitive to loss than to gain; one could 
not give to this question a fully satisfactory answer, unless one does not doubt the 
truth I have just presented; now the response is easy: one is more sensitive to loss 
than to gain, because in fact, while supposing them numerically equal, the loss is 
nevertheless always and necessarily greater than the gain; the feeling is generally 
an implicit reasoning only less clear, but often brighter, and always surer than the 
direct product of the reason.  One feels that the gain does not give us as much 
pleasure as the loss causes us pain; this feeling is only the implicit result of the 
reasoning that I have just presented. 
 
XIV. Money must not be estimated by its numerical quantity: if the metal, that is merely 
the sign of wealth, was wealth itself, that is, if the happiness or the benefits that 
result from wealth were proportional to the quantity of money, men would have 
reason to estimate it numerically and by its quantity, but it is barely necessary that 
the benefits that one derives from money are in just proportion with its quantity; a 
rich man of one hundred thousand Ecus income is not ten times happier than the 
man of only ten thousand Ecus; there is more than that what money is, as soon as 
one passes certain limits it has almost no real value, and cannot increase the well-
being of its possessor; a man that discovered a mountain of gold would not be 
richer than the one that found only one cubic fathom.XI   
Money has two values both arbitrary, both conventions, where one is the 
measure of the benefits to the individual, and where the other determines the rate 
of well-being of the society; the first of these values has never been estimated other 
than in a very vague way; the second is suitable for a just estimation by the 
                                                 
XI [comment: old measure; one cubic fathom  ≈ 6.12 m3] 
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comparison of the quantity of money with the proceeds of the land and the labour 
of men.   
To succeed in giving some precise rules on the value of money, I will examine 
special cases of which the mind grasps easily the combinations, and that, as 
examples, drive us by induction to the general estimation of the value of the money 
for the poor, for the rich, and even for the more or less wise.   
For the man who in his budget, whatever it is, has only what is necessary, 
money has an infinite value; for the man who in his budget abounds in superfluous, 
money has almost no value anymore.  But what is necessary, what is superfluous? I 
understand by necessary the income which one is obliged to spend to live as one 
has always lived; with this necessary income, one can have its comforts and even 
pleasures; but soon the habit creates needs; so, in the definition of the superfluous I 
will not account for any of the pleasures we are used to, and I say that the 
superfluous is the income that can bring us new pleasures; the loss of the 
necessary income is a loss that one feels infinitely, and when one risks a 
considerable part of this necessary income, the risk cannot be offset by any hope, 
however great one may suppose; on the contrary the loss of the superfluous income 
has limited effects; and if even superfluous income is still more sensitive to the 
loss than to the gain, it is because in fact the loss is generally always greater than 
the gain, this feeling is based on the principle that reasoning had not developed, 
because the ordinary feelings are based on common concepts or on simple 
inductions; but the delicate feelings depend on exquisite and elevating ideas, and 
are in fact only the results of several combinations often too subtle to be clearly 
noticed, and almost always too complicated to be reduced to a reasoning that can 
prove them. 
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XV. The mathematicians who have evaluated games of chance, and whose research in 
this field deserves praise, have considered money only as a quantity susceptible to 
growth and diminution, without other value than the number; they have estimated 
by the numerical quantity of money the relations of the gain and loss; they have 
calculated the risk and hope relatively to this very numerical quantity.  We 
consider here the value of the money from a different point of view, and through 
our principles we will give the solution to some embarrassing cases for ordinary 
calculation.  The problem, for example, of the game of heads and tails, where one 
supposes that two men (Peter and Paul) play against each other at these conditions 
that Peter will throw a coin in the air as many times as it will be necessary till tails 
shows up, and if that occurs at the first throw, Paul will give him one Ecu; if that 
occurs only on the second throw, Paul will give him two Ecus; if that occurs only 
on the third throw, he will give him four Ecus; if that occurs only on the fourth 
throw, Paul will give eight Ecus; if that occurs only on the fifth throw, he will give 
sixteen Ecus, and so on always doubling the number of the Ecus: it is obvious that 
in this condition Peter can only win, and that his gain will be at least an Ecu, 
maybe two Ecus, maybe four Ecus, maybe eight Ecus, maybe sixteen Ecus, maybe 
thirty-two Ecus, etc. maybe five hundred twelve Ecus, etc. maybe sixteen thousand 
three hundred eighty-four Ecus, etc. maybe five hundred twenty-four thousand 
four hundred forty-eight Ecus, etc. maybe even ten million, hundred million, 
hundred thousand millions of Ecus, maybe finally an infinity of Ecus.  Because it 
is not impossible to throw five times, ten times, fifteen times, twenty times, 
thousand times, hundred thousand times the coin without tails showing up.  One 
asks therefore how much Peter must give to Paul to compensate him, or what 
amounts to the same, what sum is equivalent to the hope of Peter who can only 
win.   
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This problem was proposed to me for the first time by the blessed Mr. Cramer, 
the famous professor of mathematics at Geneva, on a trip that I made to this city in 
the year 1730; he told me that it was previously proposed by Mr. Nicolas Bernoulli 
to Mr. de Montmort, as in fact it is found on the pages 402 and 407 of the Analysis 
of the games of chance by this author:  I dreamed this problem some time without 
finding the knot; I could not see that it was possible to make agreed mathematical 
calculations with common sense without introducing some moral considerations; 
and having expressed my ideas to Mr. Cramer,4 he told me that I was right, and 
that he had also resolved this question by a similar approach; he showed me then 
                                                 
4 It follows what I left then in writing to Mr. Cramer, and of what I kept the original copy.  "Mr. de Montmort is 
satisfied to reply to Mr. Nic. Bernoulli that the equivalent is equal to the sum of the sequence 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 
etc. Ecus continued to infinity, i.e., ∞/2, and I do not believe in fact that one can dispute his mathematical 
calculation; but far from giving an infinite equivalent, there is no man of common sense who would want to give 
twenty pounds, or even ten.   
The reason of this contradiction between the mathematical calculation and the common sense seems to 
me to consist in the relation between money and its resulting advantage.  A mathematician in his calculation 
estimates the money only by its quantity, i.e., by its numerical value; but the moral man must estimate it 
otherwise and only by the advantages or the pleasure that it can obtain; it is certain that he must behave in this 
view, and to estimate the money only in proportion to the resulting advantages, and not relatively to the quantity 
that, beyond certain limits, could not at all increase his happiness; he would, for example, hardly be happier with 
thousand million than he would be with hundred, or with hundred thousand million more than with thousand 
million; thus beyond certain limits, he would make a very big mistake to risk his money.  If, for example, ten 
thousand Ecus were all his goods, he would make an infinite mistake to risk them, and the more these ten 
thousand pounds will be an object in relation to it, the bigger will be the mistake; I believe therefore that his 
mistake would be infinite, when these ten thousand pounds were a part of his necessary income, that is, when 
these ten thousand pounds will be absolutely necessary for him to live, as he was raised and as he has always 
lived; if these ten thousand pounds are of his superfluous income, his mistake diminishes, and the more they will 
be a small part of his superfluous income the more will diminish his mistake; but it will never be zero, unless he 
can consider this part of his superfluous income with indifference, or that he only considers the expected sum 
necessary to succeed in a purpose that will give him in proportion as much of pleasure as this very sum is larger 
than the one that he risks, and it is by this way of foreseeing a future happiness, that one can not at all give rules, 
there are people for whom hope itself is a greater pleasure than they could obtain by the enjoyment of their stake; 
to reason therefore more certainly on all these things, one must establish some principles; I would say, for 
example, that necessary income is equal to the sum that one is obliged to spend to continue to live as one always 
lived; the necessary income of a King will be, for example, ten millions of revenues (because a king that had less 
would be a poor king); the necessary income of a nobleman, will be ten thousand pounds of revenue (because a 
decent man who has less would be a poor nobleman); the necessary income of a peasant will be five hundred 
pounds, because with less he would be in misery, he cannot spend less to live and to nourish his family.  I would 
suppose that the necessary income cannot give us new pleasures, or to speak more exactly, I would not account 
for any of the pleasures or advantages that we always had, and according to that, I would define the superfluous 
income as what could bring us other pleasures or new advantages; I would further say, that the loss of the 
necessary income makes itself feel infinitely; thus that it cannot be compensated by any hope, that on the 
contrary the feeling of the loss of the superfluous income is limited, and that consequently it can be compensated; 
I believe that oneself feels this truth when one plays, because the loss, even if small, gives us always more pain 
than an equal gain gives us pleasure, and is that which leads to wounded pride, since I suppose the game is 
entirely one of pure chance.  I would also say that the quantity of the money within the necessary income is 
proportional to what it returns to us, but that within the superfluous income this proportion begins diminishing, 
and diminishes the more the greater the superfluous income becomes.   
I leave you, Mister, to judge these ideas, etc. Geneva, October 3 1730. Signed, Le Clerc de Buffon. 
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his solution almost identical to the one printed later in 1738 in the Memories of the 
Academy of Petersburg following an excellent work of Mr. Daniel Bernoulli on 
the measure of chances where I saw that most of the ideas of Mr. Dan.  Bernoulli 
agreed with mine, which gave me great pleasure since I always have, in addition to 
his great talents in geometry, considered and acknowledged Mr. Dan. Bernoulli as 
one of the best minds of this century.  I found also the idea of Mr. Cramer very 
justified, and worthy of a man who has given us proofs of his skill in all the 
mathematical sciences, and to whose memory I do justice with so much more 
pleasure than there is to the company and to the friendship of this scholar whom I 
owe part of the first knowledge that I acquired in this field.  Mr. de Montmort 
gives the solution to this problem by the ordinary rules, and he says, that the 
equivalent sum to the hope of the one who can only win, is equal to the sum of the 
sequence 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2 Ecu, etc. continued to infinity, and that 
consequently this equivalent sum is an infinite sum of money.  The reason on 
which this calculation is based is that there is one half of probability that Peter who 
can only win, will have one Ecu; one quarter of probability that he will have two; 
one eight of probability that he will have four; one sixteenth of probability that he 
will have eight; one thirty-second of probability that he will have sixteen, etc. to 
infinity; and that consequently his hope for the first case is one half Ecu, because 
the hope measures itself by the probability multiplied by the amount to be obtained; 
now the probability is one half, and the sum to be obtained for the first throw is 
one Ecu; therefore hope is one half Ecu: equally his hope for the second case is 
again one half Ecu, because the probability is one quarter, and the sum to be 
obtained is two Ecus; now a quarter multiplied by two Ecus gives again one half 
Ecu.  One will find likewise that his hope for the third case is again one half Ecu; 
for the fourth case one half Ecu, in a word for all the cases to infinity always one 
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half Ecu each, since the number of Ecus grows in the same proportion as the 
number of the probabilities diminishes; therefore the sum of all these hopes is an 
infinite sum of money, and consequently it is necessary that Peter gives to Paul the 
equivalent half of an infinity of Ecus.   
That is mathematically true and one cannot dispute this calculation; also Mr. de 
Montmort and the other geometricians considered this problem as well resolved; 
but this solution is so far from being the true one that instead of giving an infinite 
sum, or even a very large sum, which already is quite different, there is no man of 
common sense who would give twenty Ecus or even ten to buy this hope of putting 
himself in the place of the one who can only win.   
 
XVI. The reason for this extraordinary contradiction to common sense and calculation 
comes from two causes, the first one is that the probability must be considered as 
zero as soon as it is very small, that is, below 1/10,000; the second cause is the 
relation between the quantity of money and its resulting benefits; the 
mathematician in his calculation estimates the money by its quantity, but the 
moral man must estimate it otherwise; for example, if one proposes to a man with 
a mediocre fortune to put one hundred thousand pounds in a lottery, because there 
is only one hundred thousand to bet against one that he will win hundred thousand 
times one hundred thousand pounds; it is certain that the probability to obtain 
hundred thousand times one hundred thousand pounds, being one against hundred 
thousand, it is certain, I say, mathematically speaking, that his hope will be worth 
his stake of one hundred thousand pounds; but this man would make a very big 
mistake to risk this sum, and an even bigger mistake, since the probability of 
winning is very small, although the money to win increases in proportion, and that 
because with hundred thousand times one hundred thousand pounds he will not 
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have double the benefits that he will have with fifty thousand times one hundred 
thousand pounds, or ten times as much benefit as he will have with ten thousand 
times hundred thousand pounds; and as the value of money, for the moral man, is 
not proportional to its quantity, but rather to the benefits that money can buy, it is 
obvious that this man must risk only in proportion to the hope of these benefits, 
which he must not calculate by the numerical quantity of the sums that he could 
obtain, since the quantity of money, beyond certain limits, could not further 
increase his happiness, and he would not be happier with hundred thousand 
millions of income than with one thousand million.   
 
XVII. To understand the connection between and the truth of all that I have just 
advanced, we examine more closely than the geometricians did, the question that 
has just been proposed; since the ordinary calculation cannot resolve it, because of 
the morale which is causing difficulties with the mathematics, let us see if other 
rules enable us to reach a solution which does not violate common sense, and 
which is at the same time in accordance with experience; this research will not be 
useless, and we will furnish the means to estimate exactly the price of money and 
the value of hope in all cases.  The first thing I remark is that in the mathematical 
calculation that gives as equivalent to the hope of Peter an infinite sum of money, 
this infinite sum of money is the sum of a sequence composed of an infinite 
number of terms each worth one half Ecu, and I notice that this sequence that 
mathematically must have an infinity of terms, cannot morally have more than 
thirty, since if the game takes until this thirtieth term, that is, if tails shows up only 
after twenty nine throws, Peter will be due a sum of 520 million 870 thousand 912 
Ecus, that is, as much money as exists perhaps in the whole kingdom of France.  
An infinite sum of money is a thing that does not exist, and all hopes based on the 
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terms to infinity beyond thirty do not exist either.  There is here a moral 
impossibility that destroys the mathematical possibility; because mathematically it 
is possible and even physically to throw thirty times, fifty, hundred times in a row, 
etc. the coin without tails showing up; but it is impossible to satisfy the condition 
of the problem,5 is to be said, to pay the number of Ecus that are due, if that 
occurs; because any money on the earth would not suffice to give the due sum, 
only up to the fortieth throw, since that would require thousand twenty-four times 
more money than exists only in the whole kingdom of France, and that it would be 
necessary that on the whole earth there are one thousand and twenty four 
kingdoms as rich as France.   
Now the mathematician has only found this infinite sum of money equivalent 
to the hope of Peter, because the first case gives him one half Ecu, the second case 
one half Ecu, and every case to the infinite one always one half Ecu; therefore the 
moral man, also counting in the same way at the beginning, will find twenty Ecus 
instead of the infinite sum, since all the terms that are beyond the fortieth one 
yield such great amounts of money that do not exist; so that it is necessary to 
count only one half Ecu for the first case, one half Ecu for the second, one half 
Ecu for the third one, etc. until forty, which gives in total twenty Ecus as 
equivalent for Peter’s hope, a sum already well reduced and well different from 
the infinite sum.  This sum of twenty Ecus will be reduced again a lot considering 
that the thirty-first term would give more than one thousand million Ecus, that is, 
it would suppose that Peter had a lot more money than the richest kingdom of 
Europe, an impossible thing to suppose, and thenceforth the terms between thirty 
                                                 
5 For this reason, one of our most skilful geometricians, the blessed M. Fontaine, introduced in the solution he 
gave us to this problem the declaration of Peter’s goods, because indeed he can give for equivalent only the 
totality of goods he owns. See this solution in the mathematical works of M. Fontaine, in-4.° Paris, 1764.  
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and forty are again imaginary, and hopes based on these terms must be looked at 
as zero, thus the equivalent of Peter’s hope, already is reduced to fifteen Ecus.   
One will reduce it again considering that the value of money should not be 
estimated by its quantity, Peter must not count thousand millions of Ecus as if 
they served him to the double of five hundred millions Ecus, or to the quadruple 
of two hundred fifty millions of Ecus, etc. and that consequently the hope of the 
thirtieth term is not one half Ecu, nor the hope of the twenty ninth, of the twenty 
eighth, etc. the value of this hope, that mathematically finds itself to be one half 
Ecu for every term, must be diminished from the second term, and always 
diminished until the last term of the sequence; because one must not estimate the 
value of the money by its numerical quantity.   
 
XVIII. But how to estimate it, how to find this value case by case for different quantities? 
What are accordingly two millions of money, if this is not the double of one 
million of the same metal? Can we give precise and general rules for this 
estimation? It seems that everyone must judge his state, and next estimate his 
utility and the quantity of money proportional to this state and to the usage he can 
make from it; but this approach is still vague and too special for it to serve as a 
principle, and I believe that one can find more general methods and safer ones to 
do this estimation; the first method that presents itself is to compare the 
mathematical calculation with experience; because in many cases, we can by 
repeated experiences, reach, as I have said, knowing the effect of chance as surely 
as if we deduced it immediately from the causes.   
I have therefore made two thousand and forty eight experiences on this 
question, that is, I played two thousand and forty eight times this game by letting a 
child throw the coin in the air; the two thousand and forty eight trials produced ten 
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thousand and fifty seven Ecus in all, thus the equivalent sum to the hope of the one 
who can only win is almost five Ecus for every trial.  In this experiment, there 
were one thousand and sixty trials that produced only one Ecu, four hundred and 
ninety four trials that produced two Ecus, two hundred and thirty two trials that 
produced four Ecus, one hundred and thirty seven trials that produced eight Ecus, 
fifty six trials that produced sixteen Ecus, twenty nine that produced thirty-two 
Ecus, twenty five trials that produced sixty four Ecus, eight trials that produced 
some one hundred and twenty eight, and finally six trials that produced two 
hundred and fifty six.  I regard this result generally as good, because it is based on 
a large number of experiences, and besides it agrees with another mathematical 
and indisputable reasoning by which one finds almost the same equivalent of five 
Ecus.  Here is the reasoning.  If one plays two thousand and forty eight trials, there 
must be naturally one thousand and twenty-four trials that will produce only one 
Ecu each, five hundred and twelve trials that will produce two, two hundred and 
fifty six trials that will produce four, one hundred and twenty eight trials that will 
produce eight, sixty-four trials that will produce sixteen, thirty-two trials that will 
produce thirty-two, sixteen trials that will produce sixty-four, eight trials that will 
produce one hundred and twenty eight, four trials that will produce two hundred 
and fifty six, two trials that will produce five hundred and twelve, one trial that 
will produce one thousand and twenty four; and finally one trial that one cannot 
estimate, but that one can neglect without appreciable error, because I can suppose 
without violating more than slightly the equality of chance, that there were one 
thousand and twenty five instead of one thousand and twenty four trials that 
produced only one Ecu, besides the equivalent on this trial being placed at the 
most extreme cannot be more than fifteen Ecus, since one has seen that for a trial 
of this game all the terms beyond the thirtieth term of the sequence give sums of 
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such great money that they do not exist, and that consequently the greatest 
equivalent one can suppose is fifteen Ecus.  Adding together all these Ecus which I 
naturally must expect by the indifference of risk, I have eleven thousand two 
hundred and sixty five Ecus for two thousand and forty eight trials.  Thus this 
reasoning gives very roughly five Ecus and one half as the equivalent which agrees 
with the experience to within 1/11.  I feel, although one will be able to criticise me, 
that this type of calculation that gives five Ecus and one half for equivalent when 
one plays two thousand and forty eight trials, would give a greater equivalent, if 
one added a much larger number of trials; because, for example, it turns out that if 
instead of playing two thousand and forty eight trials, one only plays one thousand 
and twenty four, the equivalent is very roughly five Ecus; that if one plays only 
five hundred and twelve trials, the equivalent is no more than very roughly four 
Ecus and one half; that if one plays only two hundred and fifty six, it is no more 
than four Ecus, and thus always diminishing; but the reason for concern is in the 
trial outcome that one cannot estimate which makes a considerable part of the 
totality, and it is even much more considerable, if one plays less than that, and 
consequently a large number of trials is necessary, like one thousand and twenty 
four or two thousand and forty eight which are so large that this trial outcome can 
be looked at as negligible value, or even as zero.  While following the same 
argument, one will find that if one plays one million and forty eight thousand five 
hundred and seventy six trials, the equivalent by this reasoning itself would be 
found to be almost ten Ecus; but one must consider all in the morale, and from 
there one will see that it is not possible to play one million and forty eight 
thousand five hundred and seventy six trials of this game, because even if one 
suppose only two minutes of time for every trial, including the time that it is 
necessary to pay, etc. one would find that it was necessary to play during two 
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million ninety seven thousand one hundred and fifty two minutes, that is, more 
than thirteen years of sequence, six hours a day, which is morally impossible.  And 
if one pays attention, one will find that between playing only one trial and playing 
the largest morally possible number of trials, this reasoning that gives different 
equivalents for all the different numbers of trials, yields an average equivalent of 
five Ecus. Thus I still say that the equivalent sum to the hope of the one who can 
only win is five Ecus instead of the half of an infinite sum of Ecus, as said by the 
mathematicians, and as their calculation seems to demand.   
 
XIX. Let us see if according to this estimation it would not be possible to derive the 
ratio of the money value that corresponds to the benefits resulting from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
The sum of all these probabilities, multiplied by the one of the money at stake is 
2
∞ , that is the equivalent data to the mathematical calculation for the hope of the 
one who can only win.  But we saw that this sum 
2
∞  can, in reality, only be five 
Ecus; it is necessary therefore to look for a sequence, such that the sum multiplied 
by the sequence of probabilities equals five Ecus, and this sequence being 
geometric as that of the probabilities, one will find that it is 1, 
5
9 , 
25
81 , 
125
729 , 
625
561,6 , 
125,3
049,59 , instead of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32.  Now this sequence 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 
The progression of the 
probabilities is 
2
1
 
4
1
 
8
1
 
16
1
 
32
1
 
64
1
 
128
1
 
256
1
 
512
1  
…
∞2
1
 
The progression of the 
money amounts to win is 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 … 2∞. 
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etc. represents the quantity of money, and consequently its numerical and 
mathematical value.   
And the other sequence 1, 
5
9 , 
25
81 , 
125
729 , 
625
561,6 , 
125,3
049,59 , represents the 
geometric quantity of money given by the experience, and consequently its moral 
and real value.   
Here is therefore a general estimation sufficiently close to the value of money 
for all possible cases, and independent of any assumption.  For example, one sees, 
comparing the two sequences, that two thousand pounds do not produce double the 
benefit of one thousand pounds, that 
5
1  is being discounted, and that two thousand 
pounds are in the morale and in reality only 
5
9  of two thousand pounds, that is, 
eighteen hundred pounds.  A man who has twenty thousand pounds of goods must 
not estimate it as the double of the goods of another one who has ten thousand 
pounds, because he actually does only have eighteen thousand pounds of money of 
this same currency whose value is calculated by the resulting benefits; and a man 
who even has forty thousand pounds is not four times richer than the one who has 
ten thousand pounds, because in this real currency he has only 32 thousand and 
400 pounds; a man who has 80 thousand pounds, has, by the same currency, only 
58 thousand 300 pounds; the one who has 160 thousand pounds, must only count 
104 thousand 900 pounds, that is, that although he has sixteen times more than the 
first one, he hardly has only ten times as much of our real currency. Or even again 
a man who has thirty-two times as much of money as another, for example 320 
thousand pounds in comparison to a man who has 10 thousand pounds, his wealth 
in the real currency is only 188 thousand pounds, that is, he is eighteen or nineteen 
times richer, instead of thirty-two times, etc.  The miser is like the mathematician; 
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both of them esteem the money by its numerical quantity, the sensible man 
considers neither the mass nor the number, he sees only the benefits that he can 
derive from it; he reasons better than the miser, and discerns better than the 
mathematician.  The Ecu that the poor has set aside to pay a necessary tax and the 
Ecu that completes the bags of the financier have for the miser and for the 
mathematician just the same value, the latter will count them by two equal 
quantities, the other will take it from them with equal pleasure, the sensible man 
instead will count the Ecu of the poor for a Louis, and the Ecu of the financier for 
a Liard.   
 
XX. Another consideration that comes to the support of this estimation of the moral 
value of money is that a probability must be regarded as zero as soon as it is only 
000,10
1 , that is, as soon as it is as small as the unfelt fear of death in the twenty-
four hours.  One can even say that given the intensity of this fear of death which is 
considerably larger than the intensity of all the other feelings of fear or of hope, 
one must consider as almost zero, a fear or a hope that has only 
000,1
1  of 
probability.  The weakest man could draw the lots without any emotion, if the 
ticket of death was mixed with ten thousand tickets of life; and the strong man 
must draw without fear, if this ticket is mixed with a thousand; thus in any case 
where the probability is under a thousandth, one must look at it as almost zero.  
Now, in our question, the probability is found to be 
024,1
1  as early as the tenth 
term of the sequence 
2
1 , 
4
1 , 
8
1 , 
16
1 , 
32
1 , 
64
1 , 
128
1 , 
256
1 , 
512
1 , 
024,1
1 , it follows 
that morally thinking, we must neglect all the following terms, and limit all our 
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hopes at this tenth term; which again produces five Ecu as the desired equivalent, 
and consequently confirms the accuracy of our estimation.  By rearranging and 
cancelling all the calculations where the probability becomes smaller than one 
thousandth, there will no longer remain any contradiction between the 
mathematical calculation and common sense.  All difficulties of this kind 
disappear.  The man pervaded by this truth will not dedicate more to vain hopes or 
to false fears; he will not gladly give his Ecu to obtain a thousand, unless he does 
clearly see that the probability is greater than one thousandth.  Finally, he will 
correct his frivolous hope of making a great fortune with small means.   
 
XXI. So far I have only reasoned and calculated for the truly wise man who is 
determined only by the weight of reason; but must we not give some attention to 
the great number of men whom illusion or passion deceive, and who are often 
quite comfortable with being deceived? Is there yet nothing to lose if things are 
always presented just as they are?  Is hope, however small the probability, not a 
good for all men, and the only good for the unfortunate ones?  After having 
calculated for the wise man, we therefore calculate also for the much less rare man 
who enjoys his mistakes often more than his reason.  Regardless of cases where for 
lack of all means, a glimmer of hope is a supreme good; regardless of these 
circumstances where the restless heart can only rest on the objects of its illusion, 
and only enjoys its desires; are there not thousands and thousands of occasions 
where even wisdom must throw forward a volume of hope in the absence of real 
evidence?  For example, the desire to do good, recognized in those who hold the 
reins of government, albeit without exercise, spreads on all the people a sum of 
happiness one cannot estimate; hope, albeit vain, is therefore a real good, the 
enjoyment is taken by anticipation of all other goods.  I am forced to admit that 
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full wisdom does not imply full happiness of man, that unfortunately the mere 
reason had at any time only a small number of cold listeners, and never created 
enthusiasts; that man stuffed with goods would not yet be happy if he did not hope 
for new ones; that the superfluous income becomes with time a very necessary 
thing, and that the mere difference between the wise and the non-wise is that the 
latter, at the very moment he reaches an overabundance of goods, converts this 
lovely superfluous income into the sad necessary income, and raises his state equal 
to that of his new fortune; while the wise man would use this overabundance only 
to spread the benefits and to obtain himself some new pleasures, sparing the 
consumption of the superfluous income at the same time as multiplying the 
enjoyment of it.  
 
XXII. The display of hope is the business of all money swindlers.  The big art of the 
lottery maker is to present large sums with very small probabilities, soon swollen 
by the spring of greed.  These swindlers still enlarge this ideal product, dividing it 
and giving it for very little money, which everyone can loose, a hope that, though 
much smaller, seems to be a part of the grandeur of the total sum.  One does not 
know that when the probability is below one thousandth, hope becomes zero 
however large the promised sum, since anything, however great it may be, is 
necessarily reduced to nothing as soon as it is multiplied by nothing, as is here the 
large sum of money multiplied by the probability of zero, as in general any number, 
multiplied by zero, is always zero.  One is unaware again that independently of 
this reduction of the probabilities to nothing, as soon as they are below one 
thousandth, hope suffers a successive and proportional decline of the moral value 
of money, always less than its numerical value, so that hope which numerically 
 49
appears to double from one to another, has nevertheless only 
5
9  of the real hope 
instead of 2; and correspondingly the one whose numerical hope is 4 does only 
have 
25
63  of this moral hope, this outcome being the mere reality.  Instead of 8, 
this product is only 
125
1045 ; instead of 16, it is only 
625
31110 ; instead of 32, 
125,3
799,2
18 ; 
instead of 64,
625,15
19134 ; instead of 128, 
625,78
342,17
61 ; instead of 256, 
625,390
971,77110 ; 
instead of 512, 
125,953,1
739,701198 ; instead of 1024,
625,765,9
276,456
357 , etc. thus one sees 
how much the moral hope differs in each case from the numerical hope for the real 
outcome that results from it; the wise man must therefore reject as false all the 
propositions, though proven by calculation, where the very large quantity of 
money seems to compensate the very small probability; and if he wants to risk 
with less disadvantage, he must never allocate his funds to the large venture, it is 
necessary to divide them.  To risk one hundred thousand francs on a single vessel 
or twenty-five thousand francs on four vessels is not the same thing, because one 
will have one hundred for the outcome of moral hope in the latter case, while one 
will have only eighty-one for the same outcome in the first case.  It is by this same 
reason that the most surely profitable businesses are those where the mass of the 
debt is divided between a large number of creditors.  The owner of the mass must 
suffer only light bankruptcies instead of the one that ruins him when this mass of 
his business can be placed only with a single hand or similarly only be divided 
between a small number of debtors.  Playing for high stakes in the moral sense is 
to play a bad game; a punter in the game of pharaoh who gets into his head to push 
all his cards until fifteen would lose close to a quarter on the moral product of his 
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hope, because while his numerical hope is to pull 16, his moral hope is only 
125
10413 .  It is the same for countless other examples that one could give; and in all 
it will always result that the wise man must put at risk the least possible, and that 
the prudent man who, through his position or his business, is forced to risk large 
funds, must divide them, and subtract from his speculations the hopes for which 
the probability is very small, albeit the sum to obtain is proportionally also large.   
 
XXIII. Analysis is the only instrument that has been used up-to-now in the science of 
probabilities to determine and to fix the ratios of chance; Geometry appeared 
hardly appropriate for such a delicate matter; nevertheless if one looks at it closely, 
it will be easily recognized that this advantage of Analysis over Geometry is quite 
accidental, and that chance according to whether it is modified and conditioned is 
in the domain of geometry as well as in that of analysis; to be assured of this, it is 
enough to see that games and problems of conjecture ordinarily revolve only 
around the ratios of discrete quantities; the human mind, rather familiar with 
numbers than with measurements of size, has always preferred them; games are a 
proof of it because their laws are a continual arithmetic; to put therefore Geometry 
in possession of its rights on the science of chance is only a matter of inventing 
some games that revolve on size and on its ratios or to analyse the small number of 
those of this nature that are already found; the clean-tile [franc-carreau] game can 
serve us as example: here are its very simple terms.   
In a room parquetted or paved with equal tiles of an unspecified shape one 
throws an Ecu in the air; one player bets that after its fall this Ecu will be located 
clean-tile, that is, on a single tile; the second bets that this Ecu will be located on 
two tiles, that is, it will cover one of the joints which separates them; a third player 
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bets that the Ecu will be located on two joints; a fourth one bets that the Ecu will 
be located on three, four or six joints: one asks for the chances of each of these 
players.   
To begin with, I seek the chances of the first and second player; to find them, I 
inscribe in one of the tiles a similar figure, distant from the tile borders, by the 
length of half the diameter of the Ecu; the chances of the first player will relate to 
the one of the second as the area of the circumscribed annulus relates to the area of 
the inscribed figure; that can be easily shown, because as long as the centre of the 
Ecu is in the inscribed figure, this Ecu can be located only on a single tile, since by 
construction this inscribed figure is everywhere distant from the contour of the tile, 
of a distance equal to the radius of the Ecu; and in contrast, as soon as the centre of 
the Ecu falls outside of the inscribed figure, the Ecu is necessarily located on two 
or several tiles, since then its radius is greater than the distance of the contour of 
this inscribed figure from the contour of the tile; and yet, all points where this 
centre of the Ecu may fall are represented in the first case by the area of the 
annulus which is the remainder of the tile; therefore the chances of the first player 
relate to the chances of the second, as this first area relates to the second; thus to 
render equal the chances of these two players, it is necessary that the area of the 
inscribed figure is equal to the one of the annulus, or equivalently, that it is the half 
of the total surface of the tile.  
I enjoyed to do the calculation, and I found that to play a fair game on two 
square tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the diameter of the Ecu as 
2/11:1 − ; that is, almost three and half times greater than the diameter of the 
coin with which one plays.   
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To play on triangular equilateral tiles, the border length of the tile must relate 
to the diameter of the coin as 
2/133
3)2/1(:1 + , that is, almost six times greater than 
the diameter of the coin.   
On lozenge tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the diameter of the 
coin as 
22
3)2/1(:1 + , that is, almost four times greater.   
Finally, on hexagon tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the 
diameter of the coin as 
2/11
3)2/1(:1 + , that is, almost double.   
I have not done the calculation for other figures, because these are the only 
ones by which one can fill a space without leaving some intervals for other figures; 
and I do not think it is necessary to tell that if the joints of the tiles have some 
width, they give advantage to the player who bets on the joint, and that 
consequently one will do well to render the game even more equal by giving to the 
square tile a little more than three and half times, to the triangular six times, to the 
lozenges four times, and to the hexagons two times the length of the diameter of 
the coin with which one plays.   
Now I seek the chances of the third player who bets that the Ecu will be located 
on two joints; and to find it, I inscribe in one of the tiles a similar figure as I have 
already done, next I extend the inscribed borders of this figure until they meet 
those of the tile, the chances of the third player will relate to the one of his 
opponent as the sum of the spaces enclosed between the extension of these lines 
and the borders of the tile relates to the remainder of the surface of the tile.  To be 
fully shown this requires only to be well understood.   
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I have also done the calculation for this case, and I found that to play a fair 
game on square tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the diameter of the 
coin as 2/1:1 , that is, greater than by a little less than a third.   
On triangular equilateral tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the 
diameter of the coin as 2/1:1 , that is, double.   
On lozenge tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the diameter of the 
coin as 
2
3)2/1(:1 , that is, greater by about two-fifth.   
On hexagon tiles, the border length of the tile must relate to the diameter of the 
coin as 3)2/1(:1 , that is, greater by a half-quarter.   
Now, the fourth player bets that on triangular equilateral tiles the Ecu will be 
located on six joints, that on square or on lozenge tiles it will be located on four 
joints, and on hexagon tiles it will be located on three joints; to determine his 
chances, I describe around the vertex of the tile a circle equal to the Ecu, and I say 
that on triangular equilateral tiles, his chances will relate to the one of his opponent 
as the half of the area of this circle relates to the one of the rest of the tile; that on 
square or on lozenge tiles, his chances will relate to the one of the other as the 
entire area of the circle relates to the one of the rest of the tile; and that on hexagon 
tiles, his chances will relate to the one of his opponent as the double of this area of 
the circle relates to the remainder of the tile.  While supposing therefore that the 
circumference of the circle relates to the diameter as 22 relates to 7; one will find 
that to play a fair game on triangular equilateral tiles, the border length of the tile 
must relate to the diameter of the coin as
22
37:1 , that is, greater by a little more 
than a quarter.   
On lozenge tiles, the chances will be the same as on triangular equilateral tiles.   
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On square tiles, the side of the tile must relate to the diameter of the coin, as 
7
11:1 , that is, greater by about one fifth. On hexagon tiles, the border length of 
the tile must relate to the diameter of the coin as 
44
321:1 , that is, greater by 
about one thirteenth.   
I omit here the solution of several other cases, like when one of the players bets 
that the Ecu will fall only on one joint or on two, on three, etc., these are not more 
difficult than the preceding ones; and besides, one plays rarely this game under 
different conditions than the mentioned ones.   
But if instead of throwing in the air a round piece, as an Ecu, one would throw 
a piece of another shape, as a squared Spanish pistole, or a needle, a stick, etc. the 
problem demands a little more geometry, although in general it is always possible 
to give its solution by space comparisons, as we will show.   
I suppose that in a room where the floor is simply divided by parallel joints one 
throws a stick in the air, and that one of the players bets that the stick will not cross 
any of the parallels on the floor, and that the other in contrast bets that the stick 
will cross some of these parallels; one asks for the chances of these two players.  
One can play this game on a checkerboard with a sewing needle or a headless pin.   
To find it, I first draw between the two parallel joints on the floor, BA  and 
DC ,XII two other parallel lines ba  and dc , at a distance from the primary ones 
of half the length of the stick FE , and I evidently see that as long as the middle of 
the stick is between these second two parallels, it never will be able to cross the 
primary ones in whatever position FE , fe , it may be located; and as everything 
that can occur above ba  alike occurs below dc , it is only necessary to determine 
                                                 
XII [comment: see Figure 1] 
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the one or the other; that is why I notice that all the positions of the stick can be 
represented by one quarter of the circumference of the circle of which the stick 
length is the diameter; letting therefore a2  denote the distance AC  of the floor-
joints, c  the quarter of the circumference of the circle of which the length of the 
stick is the diameter, letting b2  denote the length of the stick, and f  the length 
BA  of the joints, I will have 
______
( )f a b c−  as the expression that represents the 
probability of not crossing the floor-joint, or equivalently, as the expression of all 
cases where the middle of the stick falls below the line ba  and above the line dc .    
But when the middle of the stick falls outside the space dcba , enclosed 
between the second parallels, it can, depending on its position, cross or not cross 
the joint; so that the middle of the stick being located, for example, in ε , the arch 
Gϕ  represents all the positions where it will cross the joint, and the arch HG  all 
those where it will not cross, and as it will be the same for all the points on the line 
ϕε , I denote by dx  the small parts of this line, and γ  the arches of the circle Gϕ , 
and I have )(sin dxf γ  as the expression of all the cases where the stick crosses, 
and )sin(
_______________
dxcbf γ−  as the expression of the cases where it does not cross; I add 
this last expression to the one noticed above cbaf )(
______−  in order to have the 
entirety of the cases where the stick will not cross, and from that time I see that the 
chances of the first player relates to the one of the second as dxdxca γγ sin:sin− .   
If one wants therefore that the game is fair, one will have dxca γsin2=  or 
c
dxa
)2/1(
sin γ= , that is, equal to the area of a part of the cycloid whose generating 
circle has as diameter the stick-length b2 ; now, one knows that this cycloid-area 
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is equal to the square of the radius, therefore 
c
ba
)2/1(
2
= , that is, the length of the 
stick must be almost three quarters of the distance of the floor-joints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1. Buffon’s needle] 
 
The solution of this first case drives us easily to the one of another which 
before would have appeared more difficult, that is to determine the chances of 
these two players in a paved room of square tiles, because by inscribing in one of 
the square tiles, a square distant from all borders of the tile by the length b , first 
one has 2
_______
)( bac −  as the expression for one part of the cases where the stick does 
not cross the joint; next one finds dxba γsin)2(________−  for those of all the cases where 
it does cross, and finally dxbababc γsin)2()2( ________________ −−−  for the rest of the cases 
where it does not cross; thus the chances of the first player relates to the one of the 
second as dxbadxbacbabcbac γγ sin)2(:sin)()2()( ________________________2______ −−−−+− .XIII   
                                                 
XIII [comment: Buffon obviously means dxbadxbababcbac γγ sin)2(:sin)2()2()( 2 −−−−+− , and 
in consistence with his earlier notation, one should have the term dxba γsin)2( −  without cap for the cases 
where it does cross]. 
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If one wants therefore that the game be fair, one has 
dxbababcbac γsin)2()2()( 2________________2______ −=−+−  or dx
ba
ac γsin
2
)2/1( 2 =− ; but as we have 
seen above, 2sin bdx =γ ; therefore 2
2
2
)2/1( b
ba
ac =− ; thus the border length of the 
tile must relate to the length of the stick, almost as 1:
22
41 , that is, not completely 
double.  If one played therefore on a checkerboard with a needle of half the length 
of the side-length of the squares on the checkerboard, it is advantageous to bet that 
the needle will cross the joints.   
One finds by a similar calculation that if one plays with a squared money coin, 
the sum of the chances will relate to the chances of the player that bets on the joint 
as bAbbaca )2/1(2/14: 322 −− , where A  denotes the excess of the area of the 
circle circumscribed around the square, and b  the semi-diagonal of this square.   
These examples suffice to give an idea of the games that one can imagine on 
the relationships of size; one could propose several other problems of this type, 
which do not cease to be interesting and even useful: if one asked, for example, 
how much one risks passing a river on a more or less narrow plank; what must be 
the fear one must have of lightning or of a bomb drop, and a number of other 
problems of conjecture where one must consider only the ratio of the size, and that 
consequently belong to geometry as much as to analysis.    
 
XXIV. From the first steps that one takes in Geometry, one finds Infinity, and since the 
earliest times the Geometricians caught sight of it; the squaring of the parable and 
the treatise on Numero Arenae by Archimède prove that this great man gave 
thought to infinity, and even some of his thoughts we must share; we have 
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extended his ideas, though handled in different ways, finally we have found the art 
of applying calculus to his ideas: but the basis for the metaphysics of the infinite 
has not changed at all, and it has only been recently that some Geometricians gave 
us views on infinity that are different from those Ancients, and so far from the 
nature of the things and truth, that they were even neglected in the Works of these 
great Mathematicians.  Hence arose all the oppositions, all the contradictions that 
one suffered in calculus; hence arose the disputes between the Geometricians on 
how to make this calculation, and on the principles from which it derives; one was 
surprised by the kinds of miracles this calculation produced, this surprise was 
followed by confusion; it was believed that infinity produced all these wonders; it 
was imagined that the knowledge of infinity had been refused in all the centuries 
and has been reserved for ours; finally it was built on systems that have only 
served to obscure thought.  Let us say therefore a few words on the nature of 
infinity, which while enlightening seems to have blinded men.   
We have clear ideas about the magnitude, we see that things in general can be 
augmented or diminished, and the idea that a thing becomes larger or smaller is an 
idea as present and as familiar to us as the one about the thing itself; anything 
being thus presented to us or being only imagined, we see that it is possible to 
augment or diminish it; nothing stops, nothing destroys this possibility, one can 
always conceive the half of the smallest thing and the double of the largest thing; 
one even can conceive that it can become one hundred times, one thousand times, 
one hundred thousand times smaller or larger; and it is this possibility of growth 
without limits in what consists the true concept one must have on infinity; this 
concept is derived by us from the concept of the finite; a finite thing is a thing that 
has ends, limits; an infinite thing is only the same finite thing on which we remove 
these ends and limits; the concept of infinity is thus only a concept of deprivation, 
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and has nothing of a real object.  Here is not the place to show that space, time, 
duration, are no infinite realities; it will suffice to prove that there exists no 
number currently infinite or infinitely small, or larger or smaller than an infinite 
one, etc.   
Numbers are only an assembly of units of the same kind; the unit is not at all a 
number, the unit designates a single thing in general; but the first number 2 
denotes not only two things, but again two similar things, two things of same kind; 
it is the same for all the other numbers: yet these numbers are only representations, 
and never exist independently of the things that they represent; the characters that 
they designate do not give them any reality at all, they require a subject or rather 
an assembly of subjects to represent, to make their existence possible; I understand 
their intelligible existence, because they can only have real values; now an 
assembly of units or of subjects can never be other than finite, that is, that one 
always will be able to assign the parts of which it is composed; consequently 
numbers cannot be infinite whatever the growth one gives them.   
But, one will say, the last term of the natural sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. is it not 
infinite? Are there no last terms of other even more infinite sequences than the last 
term of the natural sequence? It seems that in general the numbers have to become 
infinite in the end, but can they still grow?  Thereto I reply, that this growth to 
which they are susceptible proves evidently that they can not at all be infinite; I 
say further that in these sequences there is no last term; that only even to suppose 
them a last term, is to destroy the quintessence of the sequence that consists in the 
succession of the terms that can be followed by other terms, and these other terms 
again by others; but all are of the same nature as the preceding ones, this is to say, 
all finite, all composed of units; thus when one supposes that a sequence has a last 
 60
term, and that the latter term is an infinite number, one contradicts to the definition 
of the number and to the general law of sequences.   
Most of our errors in metaphysics come from the reality that we give to ideas 
of deprivation; we know the finite, we recognize its real properties, we examine it, 
and by considering it after this examination we do not recognize it anymore, and 
we believe having created a new being, while we did only destroy some part of 
what we formerly had known.   
One must therefore consider infinity, in small, in large, only as a deprivation, 
an entrenchment of the concept of the finite, which can be used like an assumption 
that, in some case, can help to simplify the concepts, and must generalize their 
results in the practice of the Sciences; thus all the art is reduced to capitalizing on 
this assumption, trying to apply it to the subjects that one considers.  The whole 
merit is therefore in the application, in a word in the use one makes of it.   
 
XXV. All our knowledge is based on relationships and comparisons, everything is 
therefore relation in the Universe; and hence everything is subject to measure, 
even our ideas being all relative have nothing absolute.  There are, as we have 
explained, different degrees of probabilities and of certainty.  And even the 
evidence is more or less clear, more or less intense, according to the different 
aspects, that is, according to the relationships under which it is presented; the truth 
transmitted and compared by different minds appears under more or less large 
relationships, since the result of the affirmation or negation of a proposition by all 
men in general seems to still give weight to the truths that are best shown and most 
independent of any convention.   
The properties of matter that appear to us evidently distinct from each other 
have no relation between them; size cannot be compared to gravity, inscrutability 
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not to time, movement not to surface, etc.  These properties have in common only 
the underlying subject, and that gives them their being; each of these properties 
considered separately asks therefore for a measure of its kind, that is, a measure 
different from all the others.     
 
